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In the past few years the informal sector in countries in transition has
increasingly become the focus of research, public policy and the media.
The term ‘informal sector’ has been used to describe an extremely wide
spectrum of activities, which do not necessarily have much in common,
such as tax evasion, corruption, money laundering, organised crime,
bribery, subsistence farming, barter, petty trade, and the stealing of state
property. This is problematic for the design of public policy as these
activities may raise very different (and conflicting) policy issues.
This paper provides a framework with which to analyse these different
types of ‘hidden’ activities in order to design appropriate social, labour
market, fiscal, and other policies. We build on the concepts and
definitions of the System of National Accounts (1993), to develop a new
conceptual framework that distinguishes between four types of ‘hidden’
activities:
¾ Informal activities, which are undertaken ‘to meet basic needs’;
¾ Underground activities, which are deliberately concealed from
public authorities;
¾ Illegal activities, which generate goods and services forbidden by
the law;
¾ Household activities, which produce goods and services for own-
consumption.
We provide an example of how this concept of informal activities can be
operationalised to analyse informal employment, and apply it to the
Georgia Labour Force Survey (1999) data. Preliminary results reveal that
more than half of Georgia’s employed population works informally.
Keywords: informal sector, transition, labour markets, poverty
JEL number: H20, J20, I30, K20
1. Introduction: The Informal Sector In Countries In
Transition. Why Is It Important?
In the past few years the informal sector (or economy) in countries in
transition1 has increasingly become the focus of research, public policy
and the media. Newspapers cover front pages with eye-catching
headlines on its scale, Governments, under pressure from international
organisations to improve the state of their public finances, vow to
eradicate it, while research increasingly highlights its multifaceted
nature, as an important source of livelihoods, the cause of debilitating
public deficits, and a dynamic sector which develops in reaction to
crippling bureaucracies, corruption and excess regulation.
The informal sector has important implications for public policy from
social and labour market perspectives as well as from those of public
finance, law and national accounting. From the aspects of poverty, social
policy and the labour market, the informal sector is important because it
provides a considerable source of income and employment in countries
where formal employment opportunities are limited and social security
is almost non-existent. Indeed many have suggested that an explanation
for why the unprecedented collapse in living standards has not been
accompanied by social explosion in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS)2 is that people have managed to survive by engaging in a
multitude of ‘informal’ undeclared activities such as street trading,
subsistence agriculture, and unofficial taxi services (see for example
Barberia, Johnson, and Kaufmann 1997; Clarke 1999b; Lokshin and
Yemtsov 2001; Yakubovich 1999).
1 Countries ‘in transition’ include a wide range of countries at different stages
of ‘transition’ from planned to market economy, and with very different
cultural and historic backgrounds, including those of the Former Soviet
Union, Central and Eastern Europe, Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and
China. However, in this paper the term ‘countries in transition’ refers to the
countries of the Former Soviet Union and to those countries in Central and
Eastern Europe which are less advanced in their transition process and not
included in the first wave of EU accession.
2 The CIS consists of 13 of the 15 successor states of the former Soviet Union:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic,
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. It
excludes the three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (see EBRD 2000,
p.1).
2In many countries of the former Soviet Union, economic transition has
coincided with exceptional increases in poverty and inequality. The
World Bank estimates that more than half of the population in the CIS-7
(the seven poorest CIS countries)3 is now living in poverty, with 1999
poverty rates reaching 83% in Tajikistan, 80% in Moldova and roughly
60% in Georgia and Azerbaijan.4 Moreover, inequality in these countries
has increased sharply; the income-based Gini coefficients have doubled
from 0.2-0.3 to 0.4-0.6 since 1990 (IMF and World Bank 2002, p.9) and are
now comparable to those the most unequal economies of Latin America.
The increase in poverty has largely been due to the collapse in output,
which coupled with quick and large-scale privatisation, has resulted in
contraction of formal employment, reduction in real wages and severe
fiscal crises, crippling governments’ ability to provide social security.
With no private income from employment and no state social safety net,
people have resorted to a variety of informal, low-skilled, precarious
activities to survive.
However these low-skilled ‘informal’ activities are heavily stigmatised,
particularly in the former Soviet Union, where job status and education
are still very highly regarded, and where ‘entrepreneurial’ activity is still
somewhat associated with ‘dishonest and criminal way of making
money’ (see Dudwick 1999). During the Soviet period status was often
more important than money, and prestige, based on one’s education and
job, opened doors and secured access to deficit goods and services
which money alone could not guarantee. The collapse of formal
employment has meant that people have been deprived of the core of
their social ties, their guarantee of social protection, their social identity
and status. In this respect, informal employment is strongly associated
with social exclusion.
Atkinson (1998) distinguishes three characteristics of social exclusion:
relativity, agency and dynamics. Informal employment is associated
with all three of these characteristics. The informally employed are
marginalized and excluded relative to the societies in which they live
which regard informal employment as unworthy and disgraceful. Much
qualitative evidence points to the fact that the informally employed feel
3 The CIS-7 are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
4 These poverty rates are mostly based on national poverty lines.
3powerless to change their lives (see for example Dudwick 1999). They
are forced into informal employment to survive, because the ‘State has
abandoned them’. Thus they do not voluntarily exclude themselves, but
their exclusion involves an external agent.5 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly for the future human development in the region, the
informally employed feel excluded also because they feel that they have
little prospect for the future (the dynamic aspect of social exclusion).
Although the level of educational attainment in most countries of the
region is still higher than the European average, ten years of
employment in low-skilled jobs has meant that informal workers have
been ‘de-skilled’ or found their skills have become obsolete in the new
market economy, thereby destroying any hope of being able to change
their situation in the future.
The relationship between informal employment, poverty and social
exclusion is perhaps best exemplified by the, all too common, story of
Hamlet, a lecturer in Physics from Tblisi University, interviewed in
Batumi (a town on the opposite side of Georgia, along the Black sea
coast) where he works as an ‘informal’ driver.
Hamlet gets US$150 a month in salary. He cannot bring his
family to Batumi because his 3-year-old daughter’s asthma
would be aggravated by the damp Batumi climate. He
therefore sends US$80 to his family each month, spends
US$50 on rent and lives on the remaining US$20. He sought
work in Batumi because “I would have felt ashamed to work
as a driver in the capital. Here no one knows me. All the
same, it is difficult. Recently, I ran into my former students;
I’m ashamed to this day when I recall how I lied, and told
them that the car I drive is my own, and that I own this
apartment. To this day, they think that I’m director of some
firm” (Dudwick 1999, p.19).
In addition to the poverty and labour market aspects, the informal
economy is also important from public finance, legal and national
accounting perspectives. Tax evasion reduces government revenue and
thereby undermines the government’s ability to intervene in the
economy, provide social security, and invest in public goods. This in
5 Barry (1998) argues that it is the ‘involuntary’ characteristic of the act, which
distinguishes social exclusion from other types of social isolation.
4turn contributes to the informalisation of payments for social services
such as health care and education. At the same time, in cases where
heavy bureaucracy and corruption stifle the growth of small businesses,
the informal sector may prove to be a source of economic growth and
taxing it may not always be economically efficient. Illegal and criminal
activities undermine the legal system and lead to social instability and a
breakdown in law and order. Failure to capture all economic activities in
national accounts leads to the underestimation of GDP, which impairs
cross-country comparisons of national income, undermines the validity
of statistics based on GDP per capita, and can ultimately affect the
amount of aid a country receives or contributes, as it is generally based
on the level of GDP per capita (e.g. underestimating GDP will lead to
higher aid receipts).
So what exactly is the informal economy (or sector)? Although the term
has been very widely used, its meaning is far from clear. Indeed it is
exactly because it has no precise definition and it can mean all things to
all people that the term has been so widely used. Thus, the informal
sector (or economy) has referred to street vendors, hawkers and
domestic workers in developing countries, tax evasion, drug trafficking
and prostitution in western industrialised countries, and petty trade,
subsistence farming, the stealing of state property, barter, bribery,
corruption, money laundering and organised crime in transition
countries.
This paper aims to present a conceptual framework for transition
economies, which distinguishes informal activities that are of concern
from poverty and social exclusion perspectives from those that are more
relevant from legal and public finance perspectives. We begin with a
review of the informal sector/economy literature in developing, western
industrialised, centrally planned and transition countries. Although
comprehensive reviews of the main issues and debates exist in both
developing and industrialised countries, no attempts have been made to
provide a comprehensive, comparative review of how the informal
sector has been defined in all five contexts. The literature review reveals
that there is no consensus over what constitutes the informal sector
worldwide. We then argue for the need to distinguish between small-
scale income and employment-generating activities, which are
undertaken to meet basic needs in the absence of formal employment
opportunities and a social safety net, from those which are deliberately
concealed from the authorities for the purpose of evading taxation or
5complying with certain regulations. Not only is this distinction
important because these two sets of activities raise different policy
issues, but it is also important in order to evaluate the impact of policies
aimed at ‘eradicating’ the informal economy (in order to improve public
finance, and law and order) on people’s livelihoods.
We build on the concepts and definitions of the System of National
Accounts (1993),6 to develop a new conceptual framework that
distinguishes between four types of ‘hidden’ (unmeasured, untaxed
and/or unregulated) activities:
¾ Informal activities, which are undertaken ‘to meet basic needs’;
¾ Underground activities, which are deliberately concealed from
public authorities to avoid either the payment of taxes or
compliance with certain regulations;
¾ Illegal activities, which generate goods and services forbidden by
the law or which are unlawful when carried out by unauthorised
producers; and
¾ Household activities, which produce goods and services for own-
consumption and are outside the SNA production boundary.
Given the importance of informal employment from social policy and
labour market perspectives, we provide an example of how this
definition can be operationalised for the purposes of measuring and
analysing informal employment in transition countries. The operational
framework is applied to the Georgia Labour Force Survey data (1999), as
an example, and the results provide some preliminary information
regarding the size and nature of informal employment in Georgia.
2. What is the Informal Sector? A Review of Existing
Literature
There is no consensus over what constitutes the ‘informal’ sector
worldwide. Over the past 30 years, the term has been used in
6 The System of National Accounts consists of a coherent, consistent and
integrated set of macroeconomic accounts, balance sheets and tables based on
a set of internationally agreed concepts, definitions, classification and
accounting rules (see Eurostat, IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank. 1993.
System of National Accounts. Brussels/Luxemburg, New York, Paris,
Washington).
6developing, western industrialised, centrally planned and transition
countries to analyse a wide spectrum of activities that escape taxation,
measurement, and regulation. It has been used to describe such diverse
activities as street vending, hawking, undeclared domestic work, barter,
stealing public property, corruption, tax evasion, the Mafia and
organised crime. Below we review, in turn, the main definitions and
sources of debate in developing countries, western industrialised
countries, the Soviet Union and transition countries.
2.1 The Informal Sector in Developing Countries: A Type of
Household Enterprise
In developing countries, the term ‘informal sector’ has broadly been
associated with unregistered and unregulated small-scale activities
(enterprises) that generate income and employment for the urban poor.
There have been two main parts to the informal sector debate: The first,
which dominated much of the 1970s and 1980s, focused on the informal-
formal sector relationship. Those who supported the ‘duality’ approach’
argued that there were two distinct urban economies (the
poor/informally unemployed vs. the rich/formally employed), while
their critics saw these as two aspects of the same, single, capitalist
economy. The second, which took off in the late 1980s in Latin America
with the publication of de Soto’s (1989) work on Peru, is concerned with
the causes of the informal sector: is the primary cause of the informal
sector poverty or excess regulation?
THE INFORMAL-FORMAL SECTOR RELATIONSHIP: DUALISM OR CONTINUUM?
The term ‘informal sector’ emerged in the 1970s, at a time of crisis in
development theory, following the growing recognition that the
‘accelerated growth model’ had not succeeded in creating employment
and eliminating poverty in developing countries.7 Unprecedented
population growth, as of the 1950s, coupled with increase rural-urban
migration, and an inability of the industrialisation process to absorb the
large numbers of unskilled, illiterate workers resulted in widespread
poverty and unemployment (Moser 1994, p.13-14). However, it soon
became apparent that the urban poor were not actually ‘unemployed’,
7 The ‘accelerated growth model, which dominated development thinking
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, was based on the assumption that industrial
expansion would increase wage-sector employment and that the ‘trickle-
down’ effect would ultimately lead to redistribution of resources and income.
7but were in fact engaged in a multitude of small-scale, unregistered,
unmeasured and largely unregulated ‘informal’ activities.8
The Dualist model:
The first to employ the term ‘informal sector’ was anthropologist, Keith
Hart, who described the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ income-earning
opportunities that he observed in Ghana, equating the first with wage-
earning jobs and the second with self-employment, thereby setting the
stage for the dualist interpretation (Hart 1973, p.67).
However, it was the International Labour Office (ILO) that was to
disseminate the concept, through its very influential ‘Report on income
and employment in Kenya’ (1972), which suggested there that there
existed a marginal, poor, ‘informal’ sector of the urban economy, which
produced goods and created employment and income for the poorest of
the poor. The informal sector was seen as a separate, autonomous sector,
which was defined in contrast to the formal one through seven
distinguishing characteristics. Thus, for instance, where formal sector
units were characterised by large-scale production, incorporation, and
the use of capital-intensive technologies, informal sector units involved
small-scale production, were unincorporated and family owned and
used labour intensive technologies (ILO 1972, p.6). In contrast to Hart’s
emphasis on the individual, the ILO’s focus was exclusively on units (or
enterprises), thereby establishing the basis for most future interpretation
of the informal sector in developing countries as a set of units.
In order to measure the size of the informal sector in developing
countries, the definition was operationalised by using a set of multiple
criteria. This proved problematic, however, as each criterion could be
employed alone or in combination with others to define a universe of its
own (see Lubell 1991; Sethuraman 1976; Sethuraman 1981).9 Despite
8 This raised important questions regarding the definition of ‘employment’ and
‘unemployment’ in a development context. Is the concept of ‘unemployment’
relevant in a context where unemployment insurance is essentially inexistent
and people engage in informal activities to survive? And can the concept of
‘employment’ be limited to official, ‘formal’ employment? These questions are
the source of much research and debate in developing countries.
9 The operational definition of the informal sector included: (a) all enterprises
or production units with less than a maximum number of workers (usually
ten) or (b) enterprises with more than the suggested maximum number of
workers that specified at least one of the following additional criteria: they
8these drawbacks, this definition, based on multiple-criteria still holds
today and forms the basis of the ILO revised definition adopted in the
‘1993 Resolution Concerning Statistics of Employment in the Informal
Sector’ (ILO 1993b, par. 7-9).10
An alternative dualist interpretation was offered by PREALC, the ILO’s
World Employment Programme in Latin America. Like the ILO-Geneva,
PREALC viewed the informal sector as a marginal, unprotected sector of
the economy in which people survive. However, in contrast to the ILO-
Geneva’s focus on the enterprise, PREALC concentrated on income and
employment. Two alternative typologies were used: the first, based on
status in employment, included domestic servants, casual labourers, the
self-employed, and all persons working in enterprises employing a
maximum number (4-10) of persons. The second included all persons
whose income is below a minimum level (usually the minimum wage)
(Souza and Tokman 1976, p. 356-357).11
Finally, other dualist approaches have defined the informal sector in
terms of its position vis a vis ‘state protection’. Weeks, for instance,
argues that informal sector units operate outside the formal system of
benefits and of formal credit institutions, while formal sector units are
officially recognised, nurtured, and regulated by the State, through such
mechanisms as tariff and quota protection, import tax rebates, selective
monetary controls and licensing measures (Weeks 1975). Similarly,
Mazumdar (1976) distinguishes between informal, ‘unprotected’, urban
labour and formal, ‘protected’ urban labour and, more than a decade
later, Roberts (1990, p.35) argues that the informal sector is ‘the means
by which people make out in the absence both of state provision of basic
operated illegally; they worked on an irregular basis; they were located in a
temporary structure or in the open; they did not use electric power; they did
not depend on formal credit institutions; they did not rely on formal
distribution network, or; most of their workers had less than six years of
schooling (Sethuraman 1981, p.22).
10 This new definition is discussed in detail in part 3.2 below.
11 Note that there is considerable debate as to whether informal sector
employment can be equated with poverty. Many have argued that not all
informal workers are poor (successful informal entrepreneurs for instance)
and that not all poor work in the informal sector (low-paid industrial workers
for instance) (see Cartaya 1994; Portes and Schauffler 1993; Thomas 1995).
9welfare services and of private mutual interest associations which
defend their members and advance their interests’.
Informal-Formal Continuum
Critics of the dualist model have argued that formal and informal
activities are not separate and independent, but rather parts of one
overall capitalist system in which informal activities are subordinate to,
and dependent on, the formal sector.
The Marxist critique, for instance, rejects the whole concept of ‘informal
sector’, preferring the term ‘petty commodity production’ to refer to
these activities, which, it argues, exist at the margins of the capitalist
mode of production but are integrated into and subordinate to it
(Birkbeck 1979; Bromley and Gerry 1979; Moser 1994; Portes 1978). Two
main exploitative relationships are emphasised. On the one hand, the
informal sector is simply an extension of the production network of
large firms, providing a pool of cheap and flexible wage labour through
self-exploitation.12 On the other, it subsidizes the formal economy by
providing cheap goods and services to the labour force, therefore
enabling large firms to pay extremely low wages (Allen 1998, p.9).
Within this framework, Portes, Castells and Benton (1989, p.300) suggest
that at least three types of activities can be distinguished: direct
subsistence activities, informal activities subordinate to production and
marketing in the formal sector, and autonomous informal enterprises
with modern technology and some capacity for capital accumulation.
Similarly, Bromley and Gerry question the adequacy of the formal-
wage-employment vs. informal-self-employment dichotomy. They
suggest that there is a continuum from stable wage work to true self-
employment, passing through 4 categories of ‘casual work’: short-term
work, disguised wage-work, dependent work and finally true self-
employment (Bromley and Gerry 1979).
12 A well-known example is offered by Birkbeck’s 1978 study of informal
garbage collectors in Cali, Columbia. It shows the extent to which collectors,
the most ‘marginal’ of workers, are connected with modern capitalist
production. Informal garbage collectors supply sorted and packed plastic,
paper, bone and glass to informal deposit owners, who in turn pass on the
product to wholesalers that supply the large orders of industrial firms. The
firms dictate the final price and each intermediary along the chain takes a
share, with the collectors receiving the lowest share, and no work protection
whatsoever (Birkbeck 1979).
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Similarly, in her work on Zaire, MacGaffey calls for the introduction of a
new conceptual framework; that of the ‘Real Economy’, which includes
the totality of economic activity, and not just its component parts.13 She
argues that the division of the economy into formal and informal sectors
is arbitrary and unrealistic, and that ‘what has previously been thought
of as a marginal sector of the economy is in fact the principal means by
which it operates’ (MacGaffey 1991, p.7).14
Finally, in an attempt to reconcile the two interpretations, Sethuraman
(1981) argues that the concept of dualism does not necessarily deny the
presence of interdependence. Thomas suggests that ‘formal’ and
‘informal’ should be exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories (in
order to classify agents), but they are not required to be independent. In
fact, as Moser points out, the debate is not so much on whether or not
the informal sector is independent, but on the nature of the formal-
informal relationship. Where the dualist approach assumes a benign
relationship and therefore advocates the development of closer links
through subcontracting and credit, the petty-commodity production
school assumes the relationship is exploitative and consequently
advocates an increased autonomy of petty commodity production and
cutting the links with large-scale capitalist enterprises (Moser 1994,
p.12).
THE CAUSES OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR: EXCESS REGULATION OR POVERTY?
Much of the debate on the informal sector in the past decade has focused
on its causes. Is the primary cause of the informal sector rural-urban
migration and urban poverty or is it excess regulation, taxation and a
13 MacGaffey suggests that the real economy should consist of: ‘the recorded
economy, that is, all economic activities that are recordable and reported and
that are gathered by statistics; the non-monetised economy that is, all
activities concerned with the non-monetised production for self-consumption;
and all the remainder, which is monetised (though operating with a variety of
currencies and also through barter), unrecorded, and inadmissible (because it
is more or less legal) (MacGaffey 1991, p.10).
14 A similar argument has been presented by Harding and Jenkins (1989) for
western industrialised countries. They suggest that there is no such thing as a
separate ‘black’ or ‘hidden’ economy, but that formal and informal activities
co-exist and are part of the modern capitalist economy. There are simply
varying degrees of formality and informality depending on the context and
most social interaction partakes of a degree of each (Harding and Jenkins
1989, p. 175).
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heavy state bureaucracy? The position taken on this question largely
determines the definition used, and ultimately the policy recommended.
Poverty
The ILO-Geneva and PREALC approaches emphasise the survival
nature of informal activities, arguing that poverty is the cause of the
informal sector. In their view, activities are undertaken as an alternative
to open unemployment since, in the absence of social security benefits,
individuals cannot afford to be unemployed (Souza and Tokman 1976,
p.355-356). Informal activities are seen as marginal, and workers are
vulnerable, as they are unprotected by labour laws. Thus, they argue,
the primary path to development and to poverty alleviation is
macroeconomic policy that emphasises expanding modern sector
employment and incomes (Rakowski 1994, p.36). Some have emphasised
the ‘discrete logic of production’, which differs from that prevailing in
the formal economy, in that ‘the accent is on employment generation
and not on seeking suitable investment opportunities for the sake of
realising a return on investment’ (Guerguil 1988, p.60; Sethuraman 1981,
p.16). We will later argue that this ‘discrete logic of production’ (to use
Guerguil’s terminology) which characterises informal activities and
distinguishes them from formal ones, can also be used to distinguish
‘informal’ activities undertaken to meet basic needs from larger scale
‘underground’ activities deliberately concealed to avoid the payment of
taxes.
Excess Regulation
In the late 1980s, De Soto introduced a new dimension to the study of
the informal sector. In his best selling book, ‘The Other Path’, on ‘the
informals’ of Peru, de Soto highlights the role of excess regulation and
the state bureaucracy in creating the informal economy (de Soto 1989).
The informal sector consists of ‘potential entrepreneurs’ who are forced
to operate illegally because of flaws in the tax system and in other laws
and regulations. Although he highlights the role of rural-urban
migration, it is essentially the ‘mercantilist’ state, which only exists to
protect the interests of itself and big business, which is responsible for in
the existence of the urban informal sector. Informality is therefore the
‘popular response, which successfully breaks down this legal barrier’ (de
Soto 1989, p.11).
As noted by Rakowski (1994, p.31), de Soto’s work marked a shift away
from seeing the expansion of the informal sector as a problem for
12
development, to an emphasis on the informal sector as an asset or
solution to economic crisis and poverty. Thus, in Bromley’s words, de
Soto argues that through the combination of deregulation, de-
bureaucratisation and privatisation, ‘the size of the state apparatus can
be reduced and the quality of life of every citizen improved, and the
nation’s vast entrepreneurial potential unleashed’ (Bromley 1994, p.138).
This view of an informal sector defined as the set of ‘illegal’ activities,
resulting from excess taxation and regulation, has been the basis for
numerous studies of the informal sector in Latin America in the past
decade. Loayza, for instance, uses an empirical model of the informal
sector, defined as all ‘untaxed’ and ‘unregistered’ activities, to show that
its size depends positively on the level of taxation and labour market
restrictions, and negatively on the quality of Government (Loayza 1997).
A third approach, the so-called ‘structuralist approach’, combines
elements of both the de Soto ‘legalist’ interpretation and the PREALC
poverty-based one (see Castells and Portes 1989; Portes 1978; Portes, et
al. 1989; Portes and Schauffler 1993). The informal sector is viewed as a
product of state regulation, which essentially supports the modern
formal sector. Firms ‘go underground’ (i.e. large firms subcontract to
small firms or engage in illegal hiring practices) to lower the costs
associated with protective labour legislation. However, the structuralist
approach argues that the elimination of state controls would remove the
informal firms’ competitive advantage, which stems from their ability to
escape tax and labour regulations, and would therefore not result in the
expansion of entrepreneurial activity and reduction in poverty that is
suggested by de Soto. Nevertheless, they recognize that more
deregulation and greater flexibility is needed to enable firms to adjust to
changes in the economic conditions, but ague that it should be
supplemented with policies aimed at reducing survival activities
through capital investment in the modern industrial sector (Portes and
Schauffler 1993, p.55).
In summary, the legalist and poverty-based approaches essentially
define two different groups of activities and consequently give rise to
different policy recommendations. In the ILO/PREALC approach
illegality is a related characteristic of informality, but the basic defining
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one is its ‘discrete logic of production’.15 In the de Soto approach
illegality is the basic defining characteristic and the ‘production
rationale’ of informal enterprises is no different from that of formal ones.
Guerguil argues that these two definitions only slightly overlap. Some
activities performed to generate basic household income, such as
domestic work, may not be illegal, whereas other activities which are
illegal are not carried out with a production logic different from that of
the formal (capitalist) sector (Guerguil 1988, p.61).
2.2 The Informal Sector in Western Industrialised Countries:
Unmeasured and Untaxed Production
Whereas in developing countries the debate on the informal sector has
been mainly conceptual, in western industrialised countries, it has been
methodological, focusing principally on measurement techniques.
Moreover, whereas in developing countries there is disagreement over
what constitutes the informal sector, but agreement over what to call it,
in western industrialised countries there is general agreement over what
it is but absolutely no agreement over what to call it. Thus the terms
‘informal’ ‘black’, ‘underground’, ‘unrecorded’, ‘hidden’, ‘shadow’
‘irregular’, ‘subterranean’, ‘parallel’, economy have all been used to
essentially describe income or production, which escapes taxation
and/or GDP estimates.
Definitions have mainly been income-based. Two such definitions can be
identified: (1) The national production or income that is missed by the
statistical offices when they calculate the value of national product, and,
(2) the revenue not reported to, and discovered by the tax authorities,
which is produced in underground activities (Tanzi 1999, 344). On the
one hand, Tanzi, Macaffee and Feige all (more or less) define the
‘underground’, ‘unobserved’ or hidden’ economy as the GNP that is not
measured by official statistics because of un-reporting and/or
underreporting (although Feige also includes activities which escape
registration due to convention - e.g. household activities) (see Feige
1983; Feige 1979, 1980; Macaffee 1982; Tanzi 1982; Tanzi 1983). On the
other, Gutmann defines it as ‘the economic activity or transactions that
escape taxation’ (Gutmann 1979, p.14).
15 The ILO/PREALC’s Viktor Tokman points out that the majority of enterprises
are neither fully illegal nor fully legal, but that there exists a spectrum of
positions with ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ merely being two extremes (Tokman 1992,
p.5-6).
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As noted by Tanzi (1999), these two approaches do not necessarily
measure the same thing as tax evasion and GDP are measured in
different ways, and it is therefore possible to have a lot of tax evasion
without understating GDP. Cowell (1990) provides a useful framework
to understand how these concepts are related to one another. He
distinguishes between total economic production and officially defined
production, or production which falls within the System of National
Accounts (SNA) of a country. The second is a subset of the first and
excludes activities such as housework and do-it-yourself work. He then
shows how the black economy intersects both these production
boundaries but also includes activities such as benefit fraud and evasion
of taxes on capital gains, which are not productive activities, and
therefore fall outside the production boundaries. Thus, unmeasured GDP
includes that part of the black economy, which overlaps with total
economic production but not with officially defined production, which
by definition is allowed for in the SNA and therefore estimated, whereas
untaxed revenue includes all of the black economy (i.e. both that which
overlaps with total economic production and that which is outside of it)
(Cowell 1990, p.15).
Others, such as Dallago (1990) and Thomas (1992; 1995), have used a
definition of the ‘irregular’ economy based on legal status rather than
income. Dallago, for instance, defines the ‘irregular’ economy as
activities which are ‘deliberate attempts to evade or avoid the rules
(laws, regulations, contracts and agreements) that apply to a particular
context, the purpose being to achieve a goal that is permitted, tolerated,
or at any rate not explicitly condemned in the economic system
concerned’ (Dallago 1990, p. XVIII).
However, the core of the debate in western industrialised countries has
been on empirical methodologies. Apart from a few direct methods
(such as the tax auditing approach), most methods used have been
indirect (i.e. using available statistics). There have been three main
approaches: monetary, expenditure-income discrepancy, and
employment census methods.
Monetary approaches, which have been the most common, are based on
Cagan’s (1958) currency-ratio method, which assumed that transactions in
the underground economy are conducted in cash and that changes in the
ratio of currency to money supply could partly be explained by changes
in the size of the underground economy. Gutmann (1977; 1983),
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elaborates this model and develops the currency demand deposit method,
based on the assumption that there exists a base period in which little
subterranean activity existed, and attributes changes in the ratio of
currency to demand deposits to changes in the level of subterranean
activity. The difference in the currency ratio relative to the base period is
multiplied by the actual income velocity of money to arrive at the
estimate of the size of the irregular economy (Gutmann 1977, p.27).
Feige and Tanzi also use similar methods. Feige, who uses a transactions-
ratio method, argues that not only cash, but also cheques are used in the
irregular economy, and defines total transactions to be the sum of both.
Moreover, he suggests that while incomes may be concealed from he
authorities, underground activities will show up in transactions. Hence,
a comparison of transactions and income may be used to provide
information about the underground economy (see Feige 1979). Tanzi
combines regression analysis and the currency-deposit method, by setting
currency holdings to current and deposit accounts as the dependent
variable, and various factors, which influence the demand for money, as
the independent variables. He then compares currency holdings, with a
tax variable, to currency holdings at zero taxes and multiplies the excess
currency by the income velocity of money to arrive at the size of the
underground economy (Tanzi 1983, 290).
There have been two other, less common, methods used to estimate the
size of the underground economy. The expenditure-income discrepancy
method compares production and consumption data, either at the
national or household level, to derive the size of the underground
economy. Macafee argues that by comparing income measures of GDP,
which are primarily based on tax declarations, and expenditure
measures of GDP, which are primarily derived from industrial and
household surveys, one can obtain a reasonable indication of the size of
the ‘hidden’ economy (Macaffee 1982, p.148). Smith (1986), for example,
uses both macro economic data (national accounts) and micro economic
data (family expenditure data) to find evidence of discrepancies between
income and expenditures for the UK. Finally, the ‘employment census
methods’, involve comparing the official rate of employment and the
employment rate as calculated by other means. Examples include
comparing employment figures from population surveys to those
obtained from surveys of establishments, or comparing employment
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figures from demographic data to figures of employment derived from
the data used in the national accounts.16
What is worrying is that these methods give considerably different
estimates of the underground economy. Frey and Pommerehne find that
in the United States, the underground economy estimates for 1976 range
from 4% of GNP if one uses the expenditure-income discrepancy
approach to 22% if the transactions-ratio method is used (Frey and
Pommerehne 1982, p.18). Similarly, Smith (1986, p.84-85) finds that for
the UK, the range of estimates of the size of the black economy extends
from 2%-4% of GDP if expenditure-income discrepancy methods are
used to about 15% if monetary approaches are used.
2.3 The Soviet Second Economy: the ‘Private’ Parallel Economy
The informal economy in transition countries is not new. There has long
been a parallel, private, unregistered and untaxed part of the economy,
which during the Soviet period was referred to as the ‘second economy’.
It was Grossman (1977) who was largely responsible for the spreading of
the term ‘second economy’, which he defined as comprising ‘all
production and exchange activity that fulfills at least one of the two
following tests: (a) being directly for private gain; (b) being in some
significant respect in knowing contravention of existing law’ (Grossman
1977, p.25). Others have adopted definitions based on ideology. Los
(1990) defines the second economy as ‘all areas of economic activity
which are officially viewed as being inconsistent with the ideologically
sanctioned dominant mode of economic organisation’ (Los 1990, p.2; see
also Shelly 1990, p.12).
Thus, we can divide the ‘second economy’ activities into those that were
legal, but ideologically unacceptable and therefore officially
discriminated against, and those that were illegal. The most common
legal second economy activity was the cultivation of private ‘garden’
plots. Private agricultural production was permitted not only for
farming households that worked on collective or state farms, but also for
many workers of industrial and other sectors, including those in urban
16 Charmes (1993) uses this approach to derive the size of the informal sector in
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. He compares national statistics on the active
population (using the population census or a household survey) to statistics
on firms in these countries.
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areas who were allocated plots outside the city limits on which they
could build their dachas (summer houses) (see Braithwaite 1994, p.6;
Grossman 1982, p. 256). Research has shown that private plot
production was an important source of additional income, especially as
it was often sold (illegally) on the black market (see Grossman 1982;
Grossman and Treml 1987). Grossman and Treml estimate, for instance,
that if private plot production were considered, then the Soviet Union’s
actual agricultural production in 1977 would have been approximately
five times the official figure (Grossman and Treml 1987, p.292). Other
types of legal private activity included the construction of private
housing (however it became illegal when it involved the acquisition of
materials on the black market and the illegal hiring of construction
workers), and the private practice of certain professionals such as
physicians, dentists, teachers, and tutors (Grossman 1982, p.256).
The illegal second economy consisted of four types of activities: (1)
stealing from the state, (2) speculation, (3) illicit production and (4)
underground enterprises (Grossman 1982, 249). Stealing from the state,
which involved stealing anything from enterprise light bulbs and toilet
rolls to output produced, was widespread. Grossman relates:
‘All sources agree that it is practised by virtually everyone.
All also agree that the public takes it for granted, attaches
almost no opprobrium to it – and on the contrary,
disapproves of those who do not engage in it – and sharply
distinguishes between stealing from the state and stealing
from private individuals’ (Grossman 1982, 249).
Similarly, Simis claims that ‘the mass of the population does not look
upon theft from the state as real theft, as stealing someone else’s
property’ (Simis 1982, p.253).
Apart from the stealing of state property, stealing from the state also
included so-called left-hand work (the earning of informal income at the
formal workplace). Simis explains that left-hand work ‘is usually done
during working hours, using state tools, equipment and means of
transport’ (Simis 1982, p.261). It was widespread and considered a
normal aspect of working life. Simis and Kurkchiyan use the example of
bus drivers to illustrate left-had work in Georgia and Armenia
respectively (Kurkchiyan 2000, p.86; Simis 1982, p.265). Bus drivers had
an official wage, which served to guarantee basic security, however it
was accepted (and expected) that their main source of income came from
18
charging passengers for fares and not issuing tickets or receipts. At the
same time, they had to pay bribes to get good routes, to avoid inspection
of tickets, for bus maintenance, and so on. Kurkchiyan argues that any
driver who did not partake in left-hand work would not have been able
to survive and that ‘it was not possible to live outside the alternative
economy other than at great cost, not only in terms of income, but also in
terms of social mobility and integration in society’ (Kurkchiyan 2000,
p.86). She argues that the official and the second economy were two
inseparable and essential parts of the Soviet economy; while the first
provided a basic standard of living, the second complemented it and
ensured a reasonable lifestyle for the population.
Finally, another example of ‘stealing from the state’ was embezzlement,
which was a direct product of the shortage of goods. Thus, employees of
State-owned stores or restaurants would take rare goods and re-sell
them for a profit, or they would set them aside for their favoured
customers, from whom they could expect good tips (Grossman 1982,
p.250; Shelly 1990, p.13).
The second illegal second economy activity, which also resulted from
the shortage of goods, was speculation. Grossmann relates: ‘given the
invariable maldistribution by the state of goods over time and space and
chronic shortages of many items in the USSR, the opportunities for black
market trading for profit are nearly unlimited’ (Grossman 1982, p.251).
However, despite its pervasiveness, speculation was considered a very
serious offence and punishable by the death penalty (Simis 1982, p.267).
Nevertheless, it was normal for people to have their ‘own speculator’,
who would come around the workplace or home to sell consumer items
such as clothing or food.
A third illegal ‘second-economy’ activity was illicit production (or
moonlighting). This was production that took place for private gain
outside official working hours (as opposed to left-hand work which took
place during working hours). ‘Moonlighters’, particularly those working
in construction, were referred to as shabashniki. They were typically men
who worked in construction trades or as agricultural workers on state
and collective farms. Shelly suggests that shabashniki accounted for half
of the construction workers in some regions of the USSR (Shelly 1990,
p.16).
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Finally, the last type of illegal second economy activities were
underground enterprises, or formal enterprises that were simultaneously
involved in anything from small-scale ‘plan manipulation’ to large-scale
illegal production. Berliner (1952) argued that the main motivating
factor for a Soviet manager was not the wage, but the ‘premium’, a
bonus paid in return for fulfilling the planed output target. This often
led to a behaviour that was contrary to the interests of the State.
Common techniques used by managers for fulfilling the output targets
included: inflating statements of material requirements, arranging to
have the firm’s output plan set at a level well below capacity, producing
the wrong assortment of products, falsifying accounts, lowering the
quality of the output and, misappropriating funds (Berliner 1952, p. 348-
356). However, these techniques were also commonly used for illegally
producing extra output, which was then sold for private gain. Through
their study of a Georgian biscuit factory, Mars and Altman, find that
similar techniques were used for parallel production and that the extra
produce was then sold by ‘making a deal’ with the retailer, who would
sell them in shops next to the ‘official produce’ and share the profits
with the factory managers (Mars and Altman 1987, 201-205).
Another common example of illicit production in state enterprises was
the hiring of so-called dead souls (or ‘ghost workers’). These were
workers who took on a second job but never appeared at their place of
work and then shared their secondary wages with their employer
(Shelly 1990, p.17).
Finally, corruption has also been included in the study of the second
economy, either as an integral part of it or as a closely related activity.
Grossman identifies three types of corruption: the daily ‘petty bribing’ of
Soviet authorities, and particularly of law enforcement officials; the
tradition of prinosheniye (literally ‘bringing to’), which involved the
regular bringing of valuable gifts to one’s supervisors; and the purchase
of lucrative official positions (Grossman 1982, p.251-252). Another,
widespread form of corruption was blat, or the use of personal influence
to obtain favours to which a person or firm was lawfully entitled.
Berliner argues that blat was common in all aspects of firm’s activity,
and that its need was so great that special people were hired, the so-
called ‘tolkach’ (‘pushers’), who were responsible for ‘pushing’ for the
firm’s interests. The tolkach often lived in Moscow, or in some other large
city, and had very good personal connections. They were carried on the
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books as enterprise ‘representatives’ and often worked for several firms
at a time (Berliner 1952, p.356-358).
Thus, the second economy was heterogeneous and pervasive; it
involved everyone, from the top government official to the poorest
citizen. As Shelly points out:
At the top, were the large-scale underground businessmen,
whose success depended on their ties to members of the
official elite. Below them were the large numbers of small-
scale private businessmen, moonlighting professionals and
full time black marketers. Many of these relied on their ties
with mid-level government functionaries, for success. At the
bottom were those numerous citizens who supplemented
their incomes through some form of illegal or semi-illegal
activities such as petty theft in factories or putting aside
merchandise for favoured customers (Shelly 1990, p.23).
As we will see below, many have argued that it is the legacy of the
second economy and, more specifically, of the incentive structures that
dominate it, which has been the cause of such an extensive informal
economy during the transition period and which is in part responsible
for the failure of formal economic policies.
2.4 The Informal Sector in Transition Countries: Household
Enterprises, Untaxed Production or Second Economy?
In the past ten years, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, the
informal economy in transition countries has increasingly become the
focus of both policy and academic research. This is the result of a
growing concern with corruption, tax evasion and crime as well as with
an unprecedented increase in poverty and inequality. Given this wide
spectrum of concerns, studies have used a variety of definitions of the
informal sector (or economy) depending on the question they are
addressing. Moreover, the term ‘informal sector (or economy)’ has been
used interchangeably with ‘unofficial’, ‘hidden’, ‘underground’ and
‘shadow’ economy.
Studies of the informal sector in transition can broadly be grouped into
three groups, depending on the issues they address. In fact, they can be
seen as reflecting the three different approaches discussed so far. The
concept of the informal sector adopted by the first group of studies
resembles that used in ‘developing countries’, the one adopted by the
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second group resembles that of the ‘second economy’ and the third is
similar to approaches used in western industrialised countries.
The first group consists of those whose aim has been to understand how
people survive during the transition period, given the collapse of real wages
and persistent arrears in their payments. In these studies the informal
economy (or sector) is essentially the set of survival strategies. For
example, Johnson, Kaufmann and Ustenko identify six types of survival
strategies used in Russia, which they also refer to as ‘informal activities’:
(1) having another job; (2) using a dacha or other plot of land to grow
food; (3) working as private taxi driver; (4) renting out one’s apartment;
(5) business trips abroad (to purchase goods for resale), and; (6) renting
out one’s garage (Johnson, Kaufmann, and Ustenko 1997, p.185-186).
Similarly, Clarke (1999a; 1999b; 1999c), broadly defines the informal
sector in Russia as including unregistered primary and secondary
employment (including small-plot agricultural production), but argues
that in fact it has not provided a social safety net for the poorest, as
informal work is more of ‘an additional security for those who are
already well placed to weather the storm’ (Clarke 1999b, p. 20, 33).
Lokshin and Yemtsov (2001) also find that the higher the level of a
household’s human capital, the more likely it is to use ‘active’ coping
strategies (such as secondary work, cultivation of garden plot, or renting
out of one’s own apartment) and that these strategies are more
successful in offsetting economic shocks than the ‘passive’ strategies
(such as cutting back on food and clothing expenditures) used by
households with lower human capital.
Others have adopted the ‘traditional’ ILO definition of the informal
sector and applied it to the transition context. Anderson, for example, in
a study of the informal sector in Mongolia, defines it as ‘small-scale,
usually family-based, economic activities that may be undercounted by
official statistics and may not be subject, in practice, to the same set of
regulations and taxation as formal enterprises’ (Anderson 1998, 2). He
limits his definition, however, to legal activities, ‘monetised’ transactions
(thereby excluding household production) and the urban sector.
The second group of informal sector studies consists of those who have
analysed the transformation of the Soviet second economy into the present
informal economy. These definitions, like those the second economy, are
much broader, including a variety of activities such as barter, survival
strategies, left-hand work, bribery, corruption, money laundering, tax
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evasion and corruption. Kurkchiyan, for instance, includes ‘tax evasion,
stealing from employers, illegal contracts, bribing politicians and
officials, money laundering and so forth’ (Kurkchiyan 2000, p.96). She
argues that the present ‘informal economy’ has evolved from the long-
established Soviet tradition of informal relationships, and suggests that
although the new market economy may officially be the product of the
legislative reform, the behaviour is in fact dominated by the informal
sector, which today accounts for the largest share of the total economy
(Kurkchiyan 2000, p.93-97).
Indeed, there is much evidence of the persistence of ‘second economy’
practices in the present (informal) economy. Ledneva, for instance,
argues that both blat (or the use of personal networks in order to obtain
goods and services in short supply or to influence decision-making) and
pripiski (false reporting) are as widespread now as they were in the
Soviet Union (Ledeneva 2000, p.7). Similarly, Birdsall’s analysis of
‘covert earning schemes’ is essentially the persistence of left-hand work.
She identifies two types: the manipulation of official business
transactions to realise monetary earnings, and the exploitation of the
‘grey zones’ at the fringes of the workplace, including the diversion of
customers for a private client base, and the pocketing of fees for services
rendered through the firm (Birdsall 2000, p.5).
Feige, who has been one of the main contributors to the debate on the
measurement of the underground economy in developed countries, also
highlights the legacy of the Soviet system in determining the character
and scope of the informal, or underground, economy during the
transition period. He defines ‘underground economies’ as ‘non-
compliant behavior with institutional rules’, suggesting that there are
several types of underground economies depending on the institutional
rule being violated. He thus distinguishes between ‘unreported’
economies when fiscal rules are violated, ‘unrecorded’ economies when
income-producing activities are concealed from national accounting, and
‘illegal’ economies, when the criminal laws are violated (Feige 1997,
p.25). In his view, formal policies have failed in the former Soviet Union,
because they are based on the incentive structure of formal institutions,
whereas the dominant incentive structure is that of informal institutions,
which are a result of the Soviet system of non-compliance. Gaddy and
Ickes present a similar argument to explain the failure of enterprise
restructuring in Russia, and the emergence of a dual economy. They
suggest that while the first economy is private and restructured, the
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second is paternalistic and un-restructured, and based on ‘informal
activities’ such as barter, tax offsets and survival activities (Gaddy and
Ickes 1998, p.2).
For most authors in this group, the ‘second economy’ definition is still
valid, as most of the private sector can be considered informal.
Braithwaite (1994) and Sik (1992), for instance, both adopt ‘second
economy’ definitions to describe the informal sector in transition.
Braithwaite includes ‘all activities outside the state sector undertaken for
private gain and/or unregistered for taxes, etc. with the authorities’,
while Sik uses the lack of regulation as the main defining criterion (see
Braithwaite 1994; Sik 1992). Similarly, Commander and Tolstopiatenko
argue that the economy can be divided into two sectors: the informal
sector, which is comprised of private activities that are largely untaxed,
and the formal sector, comprised of state activities (including privatised
state enterprises) that face a set of payroll taxes (Commander and
Tolstopiatenko 1997, p.4). Moreover, they suggest that all part-time
work can be considered informal, or ‘undeclared’, and all full-time work
is formal and subject to payroll tax.
The third group of studies on the informal economy in transition
countries has focused on the measurement of unrecorded GDP and/or tax
evasion. These definitions have generally been narrower than those of the
second group, but have nevertheless been very broad, including all
income or production that escapes taxation or measurement and thereby
encompassing both survival activities and large-scale tax evasion. Some
have focused on measurement, while others have tried to explain what
causes enterprises or individuals to operate informally. Studies that have
tried to measure the informal economy have arisen from a suspicion that
GDP in the Former Soviet Union is highly undervalued and that
measures of the aggregate collapse in output greatly overestimate the
real slump in GDP (Dobozi and Pohl 1995, p.17). Kaufmann and
Kaliberda define the ‘unofficial’, or ‘informal’, economy as ‘the
unrecorded value added by any deliberate misreporting or evasion by a
firm or individual’ and use the ‘macro-electrical approach’, first applied
by Dobozi and Pohl (1995), to estimate the size of the ‘unofficial’
economy in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS. They argue that
electricity consumption provides a good measure of overall economic
activity and compare the level of income, which should have been
produced given the level of electricity consumption, to official measures
of national income. Their estimates suggest that in 1994, the unofficial
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economy accounted for approximately one quarter of GDP in Central and
Eastern Europe and one third in the countries of the former Soviet Union,
reaching up to 65-70% of GDP in Georgia (Kaufmann and Kaliberda
1996, p.2, A4).
An alternative to the Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) model is presented
by Lackò, who argues that household electricity consumption (rather than
total electricity consumption) provides a better measure of the informal
economy, as it permits the isolation of the structural changes during
transition, that may be responsible for part of the increase in overall
electricity consumption (Lackò 2000, p.122). She adopts a definition of
the ‘underground’ economy proposed by Carter (1984), which includes
‘activities that are assumed to be measured but escape official
registration or measurement’ (Lackò 2000, p.119). Her estimates are
slightly more conservative than those of Kaufmann and Kaliberda, with
CEE countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia having 22-23%
of their national income ‘unreported’ while CIS countries such as
Ukraine and Georgia had unofficial economies accounting for 53% and
57% of GDP respectively.
Others have tried to explain what causes enterprises to operate
‘informally’. Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997), for instance, find
that high tax burden, onerous regulation and low tax collection are
associated with large shares of unofficial activity, as well as with poor
public goods (such as police protection and enforcement of contracts),
and poorer economic growth performance during transition. Later,
Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) argue that in
fact, entrepreneurs go underground, not to avoid official taxes but to
reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. Finally, Kolev (1998)
points out that there are two different causes of informal employment
and therefore two main categories of the informally employed. On the
one hand, there are those who could be at ease in the regular job market,
but who are driven into the informal sector because of the disincentive
effects of the tax system, and on the other, those who are forced into it in
order to survive in the new circumstances and cope with their low
regular earnings (Kolev 1998, p.6).
2.5 In Summary
A review of the literature has highlighted that there is no consensus over
what constitutes the informal sector (or economy) worldwide. In
developing countries, the term has largely been associated with urban
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household enterprises whose main purpose is to generate income and
employment for the households concerned. The main policy and
research questions have been: (1) the extent to which the informal sector
is independent or integrated with the formal, capitalist economy, and (2)
the extent to which informal enterprises are ‘survival activities’, caused
by poverty and lack of formal employment opportunities, or ‘potential
capitalist enterprises’ that are being held in check by excessive
bureaucracy and regulation.
In western industrialised countries, the term has been used to describe all
income or production that escapes taxation and/or GDP estimates,
while the focus of the debate has been on how to measure it. In the Soviet
Union, the corresponding ‘second economy’ referred to the private, and
often illegal, activities, which were inconsistent with the dominant
ideology, and included activities such as small plot agricultural
production, stealing from the state, speculation, illicit production and
underground enterprises.
In transition countries, not only have other distinct definitions been used,
but also there has been little debate per se on what constitutes the
informal sector. Thus, each piece of research has simply used the term to
define its area of interest. Although this is mainly due to the relative
novelty of the ‘transition context’ (just over ten years have passed since
the collapse of the Soviet Union), it is time for a discussion on what is
meant by the ‘informal’, ‘underground’, ‘unofficial’, or ‘shadow’
economy in the transition context. As illustrated in this review of
existing literature the term ‘informal sector/economy’ has been used to
describe an extremely wide spectrum of activities, which do not
necessarily have much in common, from tax evasion, corruption, money
laundering and organised crime to bribery, subsistence farming, barter,
petty trade, and the stealing of state property. Below we argue that such
a broad term is not particularly useful for policy purposes and that a
conceptual framework is needed to distinguish between these different
activities.
3. A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Informal
Employment in Transition Countries
The lack of consensus on the definition of the informal sector (or
economy) is a result of the fact that it has been approached by a
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multitude of different disciplines. The informal economy is of interest to
labour statisticians, national accountants, legal specialists, social policy
experts, anthropologists, macro economists, and others. Each piece of
research uses the term to define its own particular area of interest.
Although there is no need for a unique definition of the informal
economy per se, we argue that for policy purposes it is important to
distinguish crime and deliberate tax evasion from small-scale activities
that individuals undertake to meet basic needs, and propose a
conceptual framework to distinguish between informal, underground,
household and illegal activities. We suggest that from poverty, social
policy or labour market perspectives, it is interesting to analyse informal
employment and provide an example of how the informal sector
definition can be operationalised to obtain a typology of informal
employment. We apply this typology to the Georgia Labour Force data
(1999) as an example.
3.1 Why so Many Definitions and Why is a Conceptual Framework
Needed?
The diversity in definitions of the informal sector is a result of the fact
that different units of observation and different criteria of informality
have been used. We can identify four main units of observation:
enterprises, activities, income and people. Similarly, we can identify
three main criteria used to determine informality: registration (mainly
for tax and social security purposes), measurement (in GDP statistics)
and regulation (mainly labour regulation). The informal sector has been
defined by any combination of the above units and criteria. Thus, for
instance, it has been defined as the set of all income that escapes
measurement, all enterprises that escape registration, all activities that
escape regulation, all income that escapes registration, all people whose
work escapes registration, all enterprises that escape regulation, and so
forth.
Although these concepts are related, they do not necessarily define the
same thing. For instance, the ‘registration’ and ‘measurement’ criteria
are often assumed to delineate the same group of observations (see for
example Kaufmann and Kaliberda 1996). However, as already noted,
activities that escape taxation are not necessarily activities that escape
measurement of GDP. Moreover, only productive activities are included
in GDP, whereas certain activities such as illegally exporting capital or
concealing income on capital gains, are considered tax evasion but are
not productive activities and therefore are not considered to be
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‘unmeasured GDP’. Similarly, household activities such as agricultural
production for own-consumption should be included in GDP, and
would therefore be included in measures of the underground economy
based on the measurement criterion, but are not considered part of tax
evasion. In the same way, using income or productive activities as units
does not necessarily measure the same thing, as certain taxable income is
generated by non-productive activities such as capital gains.
None of these criteria or units of observation are preferable to the others
per se. Different units and criteria may be used depending on the aim of
the research. However, it is important to make a conceptual distinction
between those unmeasured, (and/or unregistered and/or unregulated)
activities (income, enterprises, or people) whose primary purpose is to
meet basic needs, from those which are deliberately concealed to avoid
taxes or regulations. This is particularly important in transition countries
where, despite the focus of both policy and academic research on tax
evasion, money laundering and corruption, there is increasing evidence
of the existence and growth of an informal sector in the ‘developing
country’ sense, as people turn to small-scale income and employment
generating activities to generate livelihoods in the absence of sufficiently
remunerated formal employment and social security (see Anderson
1998; Bernabè 2002; Clarke 1999a, b; Lokshin and Yemtsov 2001). By
distinguishing between these two concepts, it is possible to analyse the
extent to which these ‘informal’ income-generating activities provide a
social-safety net, and the extent to which they undermine government
revenue.17 This information will be critical for public policy, as it will
allow the benefits of an increase in government revenue to be weighed
against the risk of an increase in poverty, which would result from an
attempt to ‘tax’ or ‘eradicate’ some of these income-generating activities
without providing any other form of social security.
The call to distinguish between the informal and the
underground/hidden/unofficial sector (or economy) is not new.
Thomas (1992; 1995), for instance, suggests that informal enterprises can
be distinguished from irregular ones in that the latter involve the
production of legal goods and services, but are illegal in the production
or distribution process (because they evade taxes, social security
17 Note that to this end, on-going research by this author evaluates the extent to
which the informal labour market is providing a social safety net in Georgia.
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contributions, or infringe other regulations), while the former involve
legal goods and services and are ‘quasi-legal’ in their production or
distribution process. They are ‘quasi-legal’ in that they are undertaken
‘not to evade taxes, since their earnings are unlikely to be large enough
to attract the tax collector, but because the authorities do not formally
encourage such [activities]’ (Thomas 1995, p.14).
Similarly, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the System of National Accounts (SNA) and the International
Labour Office (ILO) suggest that ‘activities performed by production
units of the informal sector are not necessarily performed with the
deliberate intention of evading the payment of taxes or social security
contributions, or infringing labour or other legislations or administrative
provisions. Accordingly the concept of informal sector activities should
be distinguished from the concept of activities of the hidden or
underground economy’ (Eurostat, IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank
1993, (5).3; ILO 1993b, Par.5(3); OECD 1997, p.16). However, as we will
see below, the argument presented here is for a distinction between
informal economic activities, and underground economic activities,
irrespective of the type of enterprise in which they take place, whereas
the ILO and OECD distinguish between activities that take place in
informal enterprises and underground activities.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also
differentiates between ‘informal work undertaken to maintain
subsistence levels’ and ‘informal labour motivated by market incentives
such as tax evasion or the business environment’ (EBRD 2000, p.102). It
suggests that informal work has played a crucial role in the provision of
employment and earnings for many people during the transition period
but that the driving forces have differed across regions, with the poorer
countries motivated by the lack of formal opportunities and a need to
survive while in the more advanced countries the motivation has been
more market-related including tax evasion and avoidance of
bureaucratic delays and impediments (EBRD 2000, p.97).
Finally, it is important to note that the use of motive (or intent) to
differentiate between activities is common practice in both law and
economics. As Cowell (1990, p.11-12) points out, from a legal perspective
the distinction between (illegal) evasion and (legal but questionable)
avoidance relies on the judge’s perception of the intentions underlying
the taxpayer’s actions. Motive also plays an important part in the
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construction of models of economic behaviour and Cowell suggests that
evasion and avoidance can be distinguished on the basis of motive and
therefore also differ in economic behaviour.
3.2 The Conceptual Framework: Informal vs. Household,
Underground, and Illegal Activities
Although the distinction between informal and underground activities is
the subtlest, it is also important to distinguish between other forms of
non-measured, non-taxed, and/or non-regulated activities. Several
authors have argued that a distinction can be made between household,
informal, underground, and illegal activities18 (Commission of the
European Communities - Eurostat, et al. 1993; ILO 1993b; Thomas 1992).
However, most of these conceptual frameworks have based their
definition of the informal sector on that adopted by the 15th International
Conference of Labour Statisticians (ILO 1993b). As argued below, this
enterprise-based definition is not necessarily appropriate for transition
countries where there has been a growing informalisation of the labour
market, which is not entirely captured by the concept of the ILO (1993b)
concept of ‘informal enterprises’.
Since the informal sector is associated with unmeasured activities, it is
useful to use the conceptual framework of the system of national
accounts. Here we propose to build on concepts defined in the 1993
Eurostat, IMF, OECD, UN, World Bank ‘System of National Accounts’
(hereon referred to as SNA 1993). As explained above the units and
criteria used to define informality19 are related, but not identical. The
choice of units and criteria ultimately depends on the reason for which
the informal sector or economy is being studied. Here we do not attempt
to argue that one unit or criterion is preferred to the others, but rather to
present a broad conceptual framework, which can be used to distinguish
between household, informal, underground or illegal sectors regardless
of the units or criteria used to define them. It is important to highlight
from the outset that the framework must therefore remain quite broad
and that it is impossible (and unrealistic) to define strict boundaries
18 Not all have used the same terminology (e.g. Thomas distinguishes between
household, informal, irregular, and criminal production), but the broad
concepts are the same.
19 Recall that four main units of observation (enterprises, activities, income and
people) and there main criteria (non-registration, non-measurement, and non-
regulation) were identified.
30
between these sectors. The sectors overlap and for certain activities,
persons, enterprises, or income, it may be difficult to determine whether
they belong to one sector or another. However, this does not deprive us
of an understanding of what constitutes the bulk of the sectors.
Moreover, here the use of the term ‘sector’ refers only to the grouping of
similar activities, enterprises, people, or income along certain lines for
the purpose of measurement and research and in no way implies that
these groupings are independent of one another. In fact, as much of the
research in developing countries has shown there is a continuum, not
only between informal and formal activities, but also between
household, informal, underground and illegal activities. However, for
policy, measurement and analytical purposes it is important to
distinguish between them. Finally, it is possible, if desired, to make the
sectors mutually exclusive by simply starting with one sector and
defining each subsequent one as including that, which is not included in
the previous ones. So, for example, starting with the household sector,
the informal sector could be defined as the set of activities, enterprises,
income or persons, which satisfy certain characteristics, and which are,
by definition, not part of the household sector, and so on.
We adopt the term ‘hidden economy’ to refer to the output from all
productive activities, enterprises, income or people which are unmeasured in
GDP and/or untaxed and/or unregulated. In order to simplify the discussion
we refer only to ‘productive economic activities’, but any of the other
units of observations could be used. The important thing is how the
sectors can be distinguished from one another. Also note that any of the
criteria (measurement, registration, regulation) could be used alone or
together, depending on the purpose.
Thus the hidden economy comprises a wide range of productive
activities from housework to organised crime. These can be grouped into
four main categories: the household sector, the informal sector, the
underground sector and the illegal sector.
We define the household sector as the set of household productive economic
activities that produce goods and services for own-consumption within the same
household and, which are unmeasured and/or untaxed and/or unregulated
because they are outside the SNA production boundary (e.g. household
cleaning, maintenance and repair of dwelling occupied by the household,
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preparation and serving of meals, care for the sick or elderly, transportation of
household members and their goods, etc).20
According to the SNA (1993) household activities producing goods for
own-consumption are only included in the SNA production boundary ‘if
the amount produced is believed to be quantitatively significant in
relation to the total supply of that good in the country’ (SNA1993: 6.25).
Thus, in developing and transition countries, activities such as
agricultural production for own-consumption (which often represents a
significant share of total national agricultural production) are included
in the SNA. We therefore excluded these activities from our definition of
the household sector and, as will be argued below, we consider them
part of the informal sector. Thus here the household sector includes
20 Productive economic activities are activities, which fall within the general
production boundary, as defined by the 1993 SNA. They must satisfy two
important criteria: (1) they are ‘carried out under the control and
responsibility of an institutional unit that uses inputs of labour, capital, and
goods and services to produce outputs of goods and services’. Thus, ‘a purely
natural process without any human involvement or direction’ such as
unmanaged growth of fish stocks in international waters is not included,
whereas the activity of fish farming is (SNA1993 : 6.15). (2) The output must
be capable of being exchanged. Thus activities such as eating drinking,
sleeping, taking exercise, etc. are not included as ‘it is impossible for one
person to obtain another person to perform them instead’, whereas activities
such as washing, preparing meals, caring for children, the sick or aged are all
activities that can be provided buy other units and therefore fall within the
general production boundary’ (SNA 1993: 6.16).
The SNA Production Boundary, as defined by the 1993 SNA, defines those
productive economic activities that should be included in GDP estimates.
Regarding the production of goods and services within the household, it
specifies that production of goods within the household should be included in
GDP if the amount produced is believed to be quantitatively significant in
relation to the total supply of that good in the country (1993 SNA:6.25).
Production of services is generally excluded from GDP ‘with the exception of
own-account production of housing services by own-occupier, and of
domestic and personal services produced by employing paid domestic staff’
(1993SNA:6.18). Productive activities which fall within the SNA production
boundary are classified in the latest revision of the UN ‘International
Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) Third
Revision’ (1989). An equivalent classification is provided by Eurostat for the
European Union in the ‘Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the
European Community (NACE Rev. 1) (1996).
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those activities that fall within the general production boundary but not
within the SNA production boundary.
Our definition of the household sector is different from that adopted by
the SNA (1993) and Thomas (1992), which include all household
production for own-consumption in the household sector (regardless of
how quantitatively significant it may be). The main reason they do this
is that both adopt the ILO (1993) concept of the informal sector, which
by definition excludes household production for own-consumption (ILO
1993b, par. 14). However, as will be argued in detail below, household
production for own final use should be included in the informal sector,
because it is included in the SNA, and because it is a very important
source of employment, income and production in many transition and
developing countries. Moreover, for public policy purposes, it should be
distinguished from other household activities such as cleaning and
cooking, which are not included in the SNA.
Finally, some authors have argued for the inclusion of non-
quantitatively significant household activities in the SNA, particularly in
developing countries where they may contribute considerably to
livelihoods (see for example Harrison 2000, p. 46-47). Since there are
market alternatives to activities such as taking care of the old or the sick
and education, then only including services that are paid for in national
income means that equivalent activities, which take place within the
household, are counted as costless. In developing and transition
countries where social services are extremely limited and incomes are
very low, household activities are an important source of income and
employment for a significant share of the population. In the UK, the
Office for National Statistics (ONS) is developing a so-called ‘household
satellite account’ which will, for the first time, measure and value the
outputs produced by households, including housing, transport,
nutrition, clothing, childcare, adult care and so forth [Office for National
Statistics UK, 2002 #231].
We define The informal sector as the set of productive economic activities,
which fall within the SNA (1993) production boundary, and are unmeasured
untaxed and/or unregulated, not because of deliberate attempts to evade the
payment of taxes or infringe labour or other legislation, but because they are
undertaken to meet basic needs (e.g. petty trade, household agricultural
production, ambulant street vending, unregistered taxi services – with own car,
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rickshaw or other means of transportation, undeclared paid domestic
employment, etc).
As previously mentioned, the ILO (1993) (and thereby the SNA 1993)
also argue for the need to distinguish informal sector activities from
underground activities on the basis that the former are not necessarily
performed with the deliberate intention of avoiding the payment of
taxes, social security contributions, or complying with certain legal
standards, while the latter are. However, there is a fundamental
difference in the conception of the informal sector presented here and
the ILO (1993) definition: The ILO (1993) definition is based on units (or
enterprises), while the one presented here is based on productive
activities, irrespective of the units (or enterprises) in which they are
carried out.
The ILO (1993) ‘Resolution Concerning Statistics of Employment in the
Informal Sector’ defines the informal sector as the set of ‘units engaged
in the production of goods or services with the primary objective of
generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned’ (ILO
1993b, 5(1)). Production units of the informal sector are defined as a
subset of household unincorporated enterprises. Household enterprises are
‘units engaged in the production of goods or services which
are not constituted as separate legal entities independently of
the households or household members that own them, and
for which no complete set of accounts (including balance
sheets of assets and liabilities) are available which would
permit a clear distinction of the production activities of the
enterprises from the other activities of their owners and the
identification of any flows of income and capital between the
enterprise and the owners’ (ILO 1993b, 7).
The informal sector definition presented here differs from the ILO
(1993b) definition in three main ways. First of all, in the ILO definition,
activities undertaken in informal sector enterprises can theoretically be
‘underground’ (i.e. undertaken with the deliberate intent of evading
taxes etc.) but they generally are not, because the ‘primary objective [of
informal sector enterprises] is to generate income and employment to
the persons concerned (ILO 1993b, 5(1)). In contrast, in the concept of the
informal sector presented here, informal activities are by definition not
underground, although it may at times be difficult to know which of the
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two categories a given activity may belong to (see figure 1 below). Thus,
defining the informal sector in terms of productive activities instead of
enterprises is conceptually more consistent with the SNA (1993)
concepts of underground, household and illegal productive activities, and
therefore enables the conceptualisation of the hidden economy as being
comprised of these four largely distinct concepts.
Secondly our definition includes all productive activities that are
unregistered, unprotected by labour and other legislation, unmeasured,
and generally outside the formal legal system, and not just those that
take place in units with certain characteristics. Informal productive
activities, can take place in informal, formal, non-informal household, or
other enterprises. The type of unit in which they take place does not
determine whether or not they are informal. This is important because it
means that all persons engaging in such activities are considered
informally employed, including casual workers in formal enterprises,
unpaid family workers in other household or formal enterprises, and all
other unregistered workers who are not protected by labour regulations
(such as minimum wage requirements, maximum hours of work, paid
holidays, protection against dismissal, etc.) and have no access to social
protection (such as pensions, health and other insurances). As
previously mentioned, this is particularly important in transition
countries (but also in developing countries and to some extent
developed countries21) where there has been a growing informalisation
of the labour market with an increase in self-employment,
subcontracting, and moonlighting (to supplement official wages and
pensions, which are often only a fraction of the minimum subsistence
level).
Indeed, since its ‘conception’ the informal sector has been of interest in
developing countries because it is an important source of income and
employment for the poor. It is a survival strategy in countries where
21 There is a literature on the informalisation of employment in western
industrialised countries, which looks at whether the growth of ‘self-
employment’ is a positive or negative phenomenon. Some have argued that it
is a sign of the efficiency, flexibility and adaptability of the labour market,
while others see it as an increase in precarious, unprotected employment,
arguing that people become ‘independent contractors’ because they lose or
cannot retain full-time wage employment with accompanying benefits (see for
example Dennis 1996).
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there are insufficient formal employment opportunities, where wages
may be too low to cover the cost of living, and where social safety nets
such as unemployment or pension benefits are either lacking or also
insufficient to cover the cost of living. As such, it should include all
productive activities, which generate income and employment for the
poor, and not just those that take place in household enterprises with
certain characteristics.
Thirdly, the ILO (1993) resolution excludes household production of
goods and services for own final use. In contrast, the definition
presented here includes these activities as long as they are part of the
SNA production boundary. As previously mentioned, goods are included
in the SNA production boundary if they are quantitatively significant in
relation to the total supply of that good in the country. In practice, in
transition countries this generally means the inclusion of the production
of agricultural goods for the household’s final use, as many other goods
produced by households, such as clothing and housing, constitute a very
small fraction of the total production of these goods in these countries.
For services, it includes the personal services produced by employing
paid domestic staff and the own-account production of housing services
by the owner-occupier.
No explanation was provided by the 1993 ‘Resolution concerning
statistics of employment in the informal sector’ for the exclusion of
household activities producing for own consumption. However in both
transition and developing countries, household agricultural production
for own consumption constitutes not only an essential source of income
and employment for a large share of the population, but also an
important share of total agricultural production. Moreover, primary
employment in household agricultural production for own-consumption
does not differ in economic behaviour from that in other informal
activities, as all are undertaken to generate income to meet basic needs.
Finally, small-plot agricultural production has been a significant source
of ‘extra income’ for households in transition countries since the Soviet
period, and as we have seen there is evidence that with the collapse in
living standards, many have turned to subsistence agriculture to
survive.
We use the concepts of underground and illegal production as defined
in the SNA (1993).
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The underground sector consists of legal productive economic activities22 that
are part of the SNA (1993) production boundary and are unmeasured and/or
untaxed and or unregulated because they are deliberately concealed from public
authorities for the following kind of reasons: to avoid the payment of income,
value added or other taxes; to avoid the payment of social security
contributions; to avoid having to meet certain legal standards such as minimum
wages, maximum hours, safety or health standards, etc.; to avoid complying
with certain administrative procedures such as completing statistical
questionnaires or other administrative forms (SNA1993: 6.34) (e.g. most cases
of tax evasion and benefit fraud).
The illegal sector consists of productive activities that generate goods and
services forbidden by law or that are unlawful when carried out by
unauthorised producers. There are two types of illegal activities: those that
produce goods and services whose sale, distribution or possession is forbidden
by law, and activities which are usually legal, but become illegal when carried
out by unauthorised producers (SNA 1993: 6.30) (e.g. production of narcotics,
illegal transportation in the form of smuggling, prostitution and unlicensed
medical practice). Furthermore illegal activities are included in the SNA
production boundary if the transactions involved are based on mutual
consent. Thus, for instance, prostitution is included but theft is not
(OECD 1997, p.12).23
The table below provides a convenient summary of the conceptual
framework. It is important to consider that the three criteria used here to
distinguish between the different sectors are not the only ones that
determine whether an activity is informal, underground or other.24 They
are just used here to help the reader recall what we have broadly
conceptualised as the household, informal, underground and illegal
sectors.
22 They are legal provided that certain standards or regulations are complied
with.
23 The SNA (1993) recognises that it may be difficult to determine whether there
is mutual consent (e.g. does bribery involve mutual consent?).
24 For example, we have not included lack of measurement, registration and
regulation as criteria. Nor have we included activities, that are illegal because























Primary reason why activity is
unmeasured/untaxed/unregulated?
Household No Yes Irrelevant*
Informal Yes Yes Activities undertaken to meet basic
needs, not deliberately concealed.
Underground Yes Yes Activities deliberately concealed to




Illegal Yes No Irrelevant
* The primary reason why household and illegal activities are unmeasured is
irrelevant to their classification in the household or illegal sector, as this is
determined by whether or not they are within the SNA production boundary and
whether or not they are legal.
As can very quickly be seen, the borderline between household,
informal, underground and illegal sectors may not be very clear, and
activities may often belong to more than one sector. The figure below
illustrates how these sectors are interrelated.
Figure 1: The relationship between informal, household, underground
and illegal activities
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As can be seen, it may not be obvious whether an activity is part of the
household or informal sector (area A in figure 1), for instance. Subsistence
farming, for instance, may be considered part of the household sector if
it is not quantitatively significant in respect to total agricultural
production (as may be the case in many western industrialised
countries), whereas it may be part of the informal sector if it is
quantitatively significant (as is the case in many developing and some
transition countries). Similarly, it may be difficult to determine whether
an activity is part of the illegal, household, or informal sectors (area B). The
cultivation of poppy seeds on household plots for instance, could be
considered as any of the three depending on whether household
production of poppy seeds is quantitatively significant with respect to
the total poppy seed production in the country, whether it is undertaken
to meet basic needs, and whether it is considered illegal in that
particular country. The boundary is similarly difficult to define between
informal and underground and between underground and illegal
activities. Thus, construction activities undertaken by unregistered
construction workers, for instance, may be considered informal or
underground (area C), depending on whether or not they are deliberately
concealed and whether they are undertaken to meet basic needs (they
could of course be both). Finally, as highlighted in the SNA (1993, 6.35),
production that does not comply with certain safety, health or other
standards, for instance, could be described as either underground or illegal
(area D).
Having said this, however, it is important to reiterate that what is
important is the conceptual distinction between these activities. We do
not require the sectors to be mutually exclusive in order to understand
what types of activities constitute the bulk of each sector.
3.2.1 HOW DOES THIS DEFINITION OF THE INFORMAL SECTOR RELATE TO
THOSE IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE?
The table below provides a simplified summary of our conceptual
framework and its relation to definitions of the informal sector in the
existing literature. Once again, it is important to clarify that this table is
neither a precise recapitulation of our conceptual framework and nor is
it a summary of the definitions in developing, industrialised, centrally
planned or transition countries. For the purpose of simplicity, the table
is based on only one unit of observation (economic activities) and one
criteria of informality (lack of measurement). Moreover, as in table 1, it
uses only three criteria to distinguish between household, informal,
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underground and illegal activities (position with respect to the SNA
production boundary; legality of goods and services produced; and
primary reason for which the activity is unmeasured).25 Finally, we only
represent the ‘main’ or ‘stereotypical’ definitions in each of these regions
although, as we have seen, there is great heterogeneity in informal sector
definitions in all regions.
According to our conceptual framework, the informal sector is represented
in table 2 by the sum of cells 2, 3 and 4 (i.e. the area with horizontal
lines). The underground sector is the sum of cells 5,6,7, the illegal sector
is the sum of cells 8,9,10, and the household sector is represented by cell
1 (e.g. cooking, cleaning, caring for the sick etc). Note that for OECD
(1997) and Thomas (1992) the household sector would be represented by
cells 1 and 3 (i.e. they include all activities aimed at producing goods
and services for own-consumption, including those that are in the SNA
production boundary, such as subsistence agriculture in many
developing and transition countries).
Definitions in ‘developing’ countries can be illustrated by the ILO (1993)
definition, which can broadly be represented in table 2 by the sum of
cells 2, 5, 6 (i.e. the area with vertical lines). In this case, the informal
sector is the set of informal own-account enterprises and enterprises of
informal employers. As we have seen, according to this definition,
activities undertaken in the informal sector can theoretically be
underground or illegal (cells 5 and 8)
25 Note that this table is not exhaustive. Another reason why activities may be
unmeasured is because of statistical error for instance. However it is not
included here as it is not relevant to our distinction between household,






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Definitions in ‘developed’ countries can broadly be represented by the sum
of cells 2 to10. This includes all activities that should be measured, taxed
or regulated, because they fall within the SNA production boundary, but
are not. Note that it may also include other activities such as the evasion
of taxes on capital gains, which we cannot represent in our matrix
because they are not productive economic activities.
As we have seen, definitions in transition countries have been extremely
varied. In the literature review, we grouped studies into three categories,
which can very broadly be represented in the table above. Definitions
used by studies that have focused on how people survive during
transition, can be represented by any combination of cells 2 and 3. Those
which have focused on measuring untaxed or unmeasured GDP have
defined it as any combination of cells 2 to 10 plus some other non-
productive activities such as capital flight. Finally, those which have
focused on the transformation of the Soviet second economy into the
informal economy are even more difficult to represent in the above table
as they have included all private sector activity, which could include
cells 2,3,5,6,8,9 and those parts of cells 4,7 and 10 which are in the
private sector plus other non-productive activities such as theft, bribery
and capital flight.
Finally, definitions in centrally planned countries are equally difficult to
illustrate in the above table and could be represented by the same cells
as those of the above group that adopted second economy definitions.
3.3 Operationalising the ‘Informal Sector’
In order to measure and study the informal sector, the conceptual
definition must be made operational. The way it is operationalised will
depend on the measurement objectives. Thus, for example, if the aim is
to measure or analyze informal employment, then labour force surveys
can be used and the definition can be operationalised based on status in
employment. If the aim is to measure the production of the informal
economy, it may be more appropriate to use household income and
expenditure surveys and to adopt an operational framework based on
productive units.
The aim here is to present an example of how the conceptual definition
of the informal sector discussed above can be operationalised for the
purposes of measuring and studying informal employment. Indeed, as
previously mentioned, from labour market, poverty and social policy
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perspectives, it is critical to understand how many people work in
unregistered, precarious, and unprotected employment, who they are,
and what types of activities they engage in, in order to design
appropriate labour market and poverty reduction policies and in order
to ensure that policies aimed at increasing government revenue by
tackling tax evasion do not have a detrimental impact on livelihoods.
3.3.1 A TYPOLOGY OF INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT
If we are to use existing data to attempt to get a measure of the extent of
informal employment in the country, assumptions will have to be made.
In particular, assumptions must be made as to what types of activities
can be considered to be undertaken ‘to meet basic needs’. One way to
operationalise the definition is to use status in employment as a proxy.26
We therefore assume that individuals engaging in certain types of
employment can be considered to be engaging in productive activities
which are unmeasured and/or untaxed and/or unregulated not because
they are deliberately concealed to evade the payment of taxes or to avoid
complying with certain laws and regulations, but because of a necessity
to generate income and employment to meet basic needs.
Our typology of informal employment includes individuals with the
following status in either their primary or secondary jobs: (1) own-
account workers and employers in household enterprises27 (2) (unpaid)
26 The ILO (1993a, (4)) ‘International Classification of Status in Employment’
classifies the employed into 6 groups: employees, employers, own-account
workers, members of producers co-operatives, contributing family workers,
and workers not classifiable by status.
27 It is important not to confuse household enterprises with the household
sector. Household enterprises are not necessarily part of the household sector
as defined here (they are only part of the household sector if they produce for
own consumption and the product is not quantitatively significant). As
discussed above, household enterprises- or unincorporated enterprises owned
by households have the following characteristics: (1) they are not constituted
as separate legal entities independently of the households or household
members that own them, and (2) they have no complete set of accounts
(including balance sheets of assets and liabilities) available, which would
permit a clear distinction of the production activities of the enterprises from
the other activities of their owners and the identification of any flows of
income and capital between the enterprise and the owners’ (ILO 1993b, 7).
Finally, household enterprises may produce for own-consumption, sale or
barter.
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contributing family workers (3) non-regular employees, and (4) others
employed casually, temporarily or seasonally (5) employees engaging in
left-hand work (or the earning of informal income at the formal
workplace).
Own-account workers and employers in household enterprises are
essentially those employed in the traditional ILO ‘informal sector’,
although we also include production for own-final use (such as small-
plot agricultural production). These are ‘informal own-account workers’
or ‘informal employers’ as defined in ILO (1993b). Unpaid contributing
family workers are also, by definition, employed in household enterprises.
Both these groups can be assumed to be unregistered, unmeasured and
unregulated, not because of a deliberate attempt to evade taxation but
because are simply generating income and employment for the
household.28
Non-regular employees are employees who do not have ‘stable contracts,
for whom the employing organisation is responsible for payment of
relevant taxes and social security contributions and/or where the
contractual relationship is subject to national labour legislation’ (ILO
1993a, par.8, 9). In contrast to western industrialised countries, where
many of those employed ‘under the table’, may be doing so to
deliberately avoid the payment of taxes, in many developing and
transition countries, these are often low-skilled, low-paid workers, who
work under such contracts because of a necessity to meet basic needs.
Both the Georgian Labour Force data and Clarke (1999c) show that non-
regular paid employees, in Georgia and Russia respectively, are largely
employed in low-skilled skilled jobs such as tea or bread manufacturing
and petty trade. It can, of course be argued, that their employers are
involved in ‘underground’ activities, because they may be deliberately
avoiding the payment of taxes and social security contributions.
However, evidence from the Georgia Labour Force data (1999) and from
Clarke (1999c) suggests that non-regular agreements are often used in
small-scale family enterprises, and often for friends, partners or
relatives, not because they are ‘a means of evading the restrictions of
labour legislation, but because they are appropriate in very small,
informally organised businesses, particularly in the sphere of trade’
28 The EBRD (2000, p.102) also considers contributing family work as informal
employment undertaken to maintain subsistence levels.
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(Clarke 1999c, p.12-13). Casual, temporary and seasonal workers in
transition countries can also be assumed to be informal in that it can
quite safely be assumed that they do not have ‘regular contracts’ and
that those who engage in such precarious employment do so to meet
basic needs.
Finally, as we have discussed, research and anecdotal evidence suggests
that left-hand work, which was widespread during the Soviet period, has
increased since the beginning of transition. These activities should be
considered informal, as they are unregistered and unaccounted for not
because of a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of taxes but
because of a necessity to meet basic needs. As Birdsall highlights,
activities such as the overcharging of customers, the pocketing of fees for
official services or the diversion of clientele from the firm are as vital to
livelihood as formal wages and can constitute a significant part of
worker’s earnings (Birdsall 2000, p.1). Left-hand work is regarded as a
way in which people ‘get by’ in the absence of sufficient formal income;
‘their small-scale allows the practitioner to ‘tread water’ but not get
ahead’ (Birdsall 2000, p.3).
This typology is distinct from the ILO operational definition in five
significant ways. First, as discussed extensively above, it includes all
forms of vulnerable, invisible, precarious ‘informal’ employment and
not only that which takes place in ‘informal sector enterprises’. Second, it
includes left-hand work, or the earning of informal income at the formal
work place. Third, as we have seen, it includes employment in the
production of goods and services for own consumption (in practice this
means agricultural production for own-consumption and paid domestic
employment). Fourth, it includes employment in agriculture. The ILO
(1993:16) excluded agricultural activities from the informal sector ‘for
practical reasons’. It had no objection to their inclusion from a
conceptual point of view, but from an operational one it deemed that it
would be inconvenient to include them in the informal sector, as
agriculture represents such an important share of employment in
developing countries and it would therefore be very expensive to cover
agricultural activities in informal sector surveys. However, precisely
because it is such an important source of (largely informal) employment
in developing and in the poorer transition countries and because it has
proved to be one of the main strategies employed by households to cope
with the fall in living standards in many transition countries, it is argued
here that agriculture should be included. Fifth, whereas the large
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majority of informal sector studies using the ILO (1993) operational
framework have included only the urban sector, both rural and urban
employment is included here. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
the ILO 1993 Resolution explicitly states that both urban and rural
activities should be included. However, it recommends that given that
the informal sector is so widespread in rural areas, and that it may be
very expensive to carry out surveys across both urban and rural areas,
countries could start by measuring the urban informal sector (ILO
1993b,14).
3.3.2 AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE: THE CASE OF GEORGIA
The Georgia Labour Force Survey (1998, 1999) is a nationally
representative, quarterly survey, co-designed by Georgian and ILO
statisticians. It covers the entire territory of Georgia, with the exclusion
of the regions of Abkhazia and Tsingvali (South Ossetia). The sample
size is 5,000 households, and households stay in the sample for four
quarters.
To apply the typology of informal employment to the Georgia Labour
Force survey, we must use proxies for ‘household enterprises’, ‘non-
regular employment’, and ‘left-hand work’. First, we use location as a
proxy for ‘unincorporated household enterprises’ rather than
‘registration’ or ‘number of employees below a certain number’, as per
the ILO (1993) definition.29 Thus own-account workers and employers in
household enterprises include: (1) own-account workers or employers
whose business is located at home, outside home, in a street booth, on a
construction site, in a market place, at a customer’s home or in a non-
fixed location (2) own-account workers or employers whose business
takes place in a factory, office, establishment, shop, workshop, etc.
which is independent from the home and is not registered, and (3) own-
account workers or employers working on their own or rented plot of
29 The ILO(1993) operational definition of the informal sector consists of
household enterprises that are either (1) informal ‘own-account enterprises’ or
‘enterprises of informal employers’. The first are operated by own-account
workers and can employ contributing family workers and employees,
however they do not employ employees on a continuous basis. The second
employ one or more employees on a continuous basis. For operational
purposes, all own-account workers are usually included as are employers
operating enterprises, which are unregistered or employ less than a maximum
number of workers (usually 4-10).
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land, in agriculture, either in an urban area or in a non-registered rural
enterprise.
Location is used as a proxy for household enterprises in the case of the
Georgian Labour Force data because the question on registration is not
particularly meaningful. Over 90% of own-account workers said they
were ‘registered’. However, qualitative research and anecdotal evidence
suggest that in some cases this may refer to the payment of some kind of
local licence fee (to obtain a permit to sell in a market for instance), while
in others it refers to the payment of bribes to local police, sanitary
inspectors, tax inspectors, and local racketeers.30 However, in neither of
these cases does the ILO ‘registration criterion’ apply, since it refers to
registration under national legislation, such as under ‘factory or
commercial acts, tax or social security laws, professional groups
regulatory acts, or similar acts, laws or regulations established by
national legislative bodies’ (ILO 1993b, :8.(3)). The OECD (1997) also
argues that it is inappropriate to define the informal sector in transition
countries according to legal status or to the relation with public
authorities since most of these countries lack business laws and
regulations and the means to enforce them.
Similarly, identifying informal enterprises by the number of employees
(less than 4 - which is generally the lowest number used in such cases) is
also inappropriate, as over 97% of own-account workers and employers
work in enterprises with less than 4 people (including owners,
employees, unpaid workers and casual workers). It would therefore
amount to including all own-account workers and employers and it
could be argued that it would also include professionals (doctors,
lawyers, accountants) etc. who could have relatively high incomes and
intentionally conceal their activities to avoid the payment of taxes. The
most appropriate proxy for household enterprises in the Georgia Labour
Force Survey is therefore location.31
30 As an example of these ‘unofficial’ taxes, Dudwick (1999, p.29) relates: ‘to sell
Khachapuri, a cheese pastry, in the market, Gayane pays the tax inspector 50
Lari (US$25) and the director of the market 120 Lari (US$60) each month.
31 However, as can be seen in the operational framework below, the registration
criterion is used for employers and own-account workers working in ‘non-
household’ locations such as offices, factories, establishments, etc. (although
they only represent 0.03% of total employment). Registration is also used to
identify informal rural agricultural own-account workers and employers. This
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Second, we use ‘employees with an oral agreement’ as a proxy for ‘non-
regular employees’. In many transition countries, including Georgia and
Russia, oral employment agreements are illegal. Although in most
western industrialised countries the law regards oral employment
contracts as legally binding and therefore offers employees hired on the
basis of oral agreements the same protection as those hired under
written agreements, in most CIS countries (including Russia and
Georgia), oral agreements have no legal force and those employed under
such agreements have no protection under the labour code (Clarke
1999c, p.8). Moreover, employment based on an oral agreement is
unregistered and therefore employers will not pay any of the taxes and
social security payments required by the law.
Finally, we are obliged to omit left-hand work, as it is problematic to
operationalise. Not only are there no questions in the Georgia Labour
Force Survey that would permit us to identify individuals engaging in
informal income-earning activities at the formal work place, but also
even if there were such questions responses may not be reliable, as
individuals are likely to be reluctant to disclose such information. One
possible way of analysing such activities would be to use the existing
literature to identify occupations that typically give rise to opportunities
for left-hand work and to analyse the income-consumption gap of
individuals employed in these occupations. This could be tried in future
research. However, left-hand work is perhaps best studied by qualitative
means.
The operational framework presented below provides a detailed, step-
by-step flowchart of how the informally employed are identified in the
Georgia Labour Force Survey (1999). For the purposes of analysis and
presentation, the informally employed are grouped into five major
categories: (1) informal self-employed: own-account workers and
is because the data suggests that agricultural workers who say their enterprise
is located ‘at home’ rather than ‘on a plot of land’ are less likely to be
registered. This suggests that these could be, smaller, subsistence ‘garden
plots’. We also include own-account workers and employers engaging in
urban agriculture for similar reasons. Since own-account work in agriculture
accounts for more than half of total employment in Georgia (Bernabè 2002), it
is important to identify the more vulnerable and precariously employed. To
this end, lack of registration and urban setting appear to be meaningful
criteria. However we could also have included all own-account workers in
agriculture.
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employers working in household enterprises32 (categories P1a to P1d +
P2a to P2d), (2) unpaid contributing family workers (P3), (3) informal
employees: employees with oral agreements, and employees employed
casually or temporarily (P4+P5) (4) other informals: others (including
members of producers co-operatives) working either casually,
temporarily or in typically informal activities (P6+P7a+P7b),33 and (5)
informal secondary jobholders: workers with formal primary jobs and
informal secondary jobs (S1 to S7b).
In the framework below P and S refer to Primary and Secondary
employment. We consider all those with an informal primary job or with
a formal primary job and an informal secondary job to be informally
employed. Primary employment is checked first. If primary employment
is not informal, then secondary employment is checked, thereby
avoiding any double counting.
32 We merge own-account workers with employers because employers
accounted for only 1.5% of total employment and ‘informal’ employers
accounted for only 0.7% of total employment in 1999.
33 Members of producer’s co-operatives and those with unidentified status in
employment are not asked about the location of their work. We therefore use
casual/temporary/seasonal employment as a criteria and check whether they
are involved in activities or occupations for which more than 50% of workers
are informal. This group represents a very small share of total employment.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Application of our typology to the Georgia Labour Force Survey
data (1999) yields the following results.
Table 3: Informal employment by personal characteristics and type of
informal employment





















Total Employed 52% 8.9% 30.6% 7.5% 0.8% 4.2% 48%
Gender
females 57% 6.1% 40.2% 5.4% 0.8% 4.1% 43%
males 48% 11.7% 21.5% 9.6% 1.0% 4.1% 52%
Urban/Rural
urban 38% 13.9% 7.9% 12.4% 1.4% 2.0% 62%
rural 62% 5.6% 46.0% 4.2% 0.5% 5.6% 38%
Age Group
15-25 76% 3.8% 61.1% 9.0% 0.8% 1.0% 24%
26-35 54% 7.4% 33.4% 8.9% 1.0% 3.7% 46%
36-45 50% 10.6% 22.8% 10.0% 1.3% 5.1% 50%
46-55 47% 9.5% 21.2% 8.9% 0.8% 6.7% 53%
56-65 49% 9.7% 28.7% 5.4% 0.7% 4.2% 51%
66+ 48% 9.7% 34.9% 1.6% 0.2% 1.7% 52%
Educational Attainment
elementary 48% 8.6% 34.6% 2.7% 0.4% 1.5% 52%
incomplete secondary 61% 8.6% 44.3% 5.2% 0.5% 2.5% 39%
secondary 66% 10.0% 43.3% 9.2% 1.2% 2.0% 34%
vocational, technical 56% 10.3% 27.1% 11.7% 1.0% 5.5% 44%
special secondary 51% 9.3% 26.1% 8.1% 1.0% 6.4% 49%
higher 29% 6.3% 10.4% 5.0% 0.4% 6.4% 71%
Region
Kakheti 57% 9.3% 33.2% 6.8% 0.0% 7.1% 43%
Tblisi 22% 9.8% 0.6% 10.2% 1.1% 0.7% 78%
Shida Kartli 52% 10.9% 32.1% 5.8% 0.9% 2.2% 48%
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Kvemo Kartli 55% 8.3% 34.3% 5.2% 0.6% 6.9% 45%
Samtsxe-Javakheti 61% 7.8% 36.6% 3.4% 0.1% 13.6% 39%
Adjara 52% 7.0% 27.1% 16.1% 0.5% 1.3% 48%
Guria 66% 5.4% 42.4% 5.7% 1.0% 11.1% 34%
Samegrelo 70% 12.5% 44.1% 8.6% 2.2% 3.0% 30%
Imereti 59% 7.4% 42.8% 5.1% 0.8% 2.5% 41%
Sector
state sector 18% 0.8% 0.2% 5.4% 0.3% 10.9% 82%




forestry, fishing (A+B) 69% 7.5% 57.9% 2.0% 0.1% 1.2% 31%
manufacturing (D) 38% 7.1% 1.4% 24.6% 0.3% 4.5% 62%
electricity, gas and water
supply (E) 16% 0.3% 0.0% 6.5% 0.0% 9.1% 84%
construction (F) 52% 12.6% 0.9% 33.0% 0.6% 4.4% 48%
wholesale and retail
trade (G) 74% 37.5% 2.4% 26.3% 6.7% 1.4% 26%
hotels and restaurants
(H) 50% 9.9% 1.3% 34.2% 0.0% 4.9% 50%
transport and
communication (I) 35% 14.7% 0.7% 11.0% 1.1% 7.0% 65%
financial intermediation,
real estate, other
business activities (J+K) 19% 4.2% 0.2% 6.4% 2.0% 5.9% 81%
public administration
and defence (L) 12% 0.1% 0.1% 3.2% 0.1% 8.2% 88%
education (M) 20% 0.8% 0.1% 2.9% 0.1% 15.9% 80%
health and social work
(N) 13% 0.4% 0.1% 2.6% 0.0% 10.0% 87%
other community,
personal service
activities (O) 19% 3.3% 0.6% 7.4% 0.1% 8.2% 81%
private households with
employed persons (P) 99% 17.5% 3.5% 69.5% 7.3% 1.0% 1%
other (C+O) 29% 4.3% 5.6% 10.4% 0.6% 8.4% 71%
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Notes to Table 3: *Secondary job holders have a formal primary job and informal
secondary job. They are considered informally employed. The sector and category of
economic activity refers to their primary job
** NACE Rev. 1 (EUROSTAT 1996) categories of economic activity.
Some very preliminary observations can be made on the basis of these
figures, however more in depth research is needed to understand the
characteristics and causes of informal employment in Georgia.
¾ The majority of employment in Georgia is informal: 52% of the
employed were informally employed in 1999. More than half are
unpaid contributing family workers, mostly on family farms.
¾ If we apply the ILO (1993b) definition and include only those
employed in informal sector enterprises,34 we find that about one
fifth of employment is in informal sector enterprises. The
difference is made up of unpaid contributing family workers,
informal employees, casual, temporary and seasonal workers in
non-informal enterprises.
¾ The majority of informal employment is in agriculture. Small-scale
urban agriculture and unregistered rural plots account for 69% of
total informal employment.
¾ Females work more informally than males: 57% of employed
females vs. 48% of employed males worked informally in 1999. A
higher proportion of females are unpaid contributing family
workers.
¾ Informal employment is more rural than urban: 38% of urban
employment is informal whereas 62% of rural employment is
informal. This is not surprising given the share of informal
employment in agriculture.
¾ The State sector is largely formal, however 18% of state employees
work informally. Most have formal primary jobs with informal
secondary jobs (moonlighting). The majority of private sector
employment is informal: 69% of those working in the private
sector are informally employed. Most are contributing family
workers, self-employed and informal employees.
¾ Youth and pensioners are more informally employed. More than
three-quarters of employed 15-24 year olds work informally (these
34 We include all household enterprises in the informal sector because the data
does not allow us to separate household enterprises producing exclusively for
own-consumption from those producing for sale or barter.
54
are youth whose main occupation is employment and not
education). Over 65 year-olds also have surprisingly high rates of
informal employment, with 48% of the employed working
informally. This is worrying given that almost half of over 65 year
olds are employed.
¾ Lower education seems to be associated with informal
employment (66% of those with secondary education work
informally), while higher education is associated with formal
employment (only 29% of those with higher education work
informally).
¾ Some regions have especially high shares of informal employment:
in particular Samegrelo, Guria and Samtske Javaxeti, which are
amongst Georgia’s poorest regions.
¾ Informal employment seems to be associated with certain




This paper has presented a conceptual framework for the analysis of the
informal sector in countries in transition. A review of the literature in
developing, western industrialised, centrally planned and transition
countries reveals that there is no consensus worldwide over what
constitutes the informal sector. However, in transition countries, not only
has the term been interpreted differently, but also there has been no real
discussion on what constitutes the informal sector; each individual piece
of research has simply used the term to define its own area of interest.
Thus the ‘informal’ (‘underground’, ‘unofficial’, or ‘shadow’, etc.)
economy has included an extremely wide spectrum of activities such as
tax evasion, corruption, money laundering, organised crime, bribery,
subsistence farming, barter, petty trade, and the stealing of state
property.
We argued that although there is no need for a unique definition of the
informal economy per se, for policy purposes it is important to
distinguish small-scale income and employment-generating activities,
which are undertaken to meet basic needs in the absence of formal
employment opportunities and social protection, from those which are
deliberately concealed from the authorities for the purpose of evading
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taxes or not complying with certain regulations. Building on the 1993
System of National Accounts (SNA), we developed a new conceptual
framework for the ‘hidden economy’ that distinguishes between four
types of unregistered, unmeasured and/or unregulated activities: (1)
‘informal’ activities, which are undertaken ‘to meet basic needs’ and are
within the SNA production boundary; (2) ‘underground’ activities, which
are deliberately concealed from public authorities to avoid either the
payment of taxes or compliance with certain regulations; (3) illegal
activities, which generate goods and services forbidden by the law or
which are unlawful when carried out by unauthorised producers; and
(4) household activities, which produce goods and services for own-
consumption and are outside the SNA production boundary.
Given the importance of informal employment from labour market,
poverty and social policy perspectives, we operationalised the above
definition of the informal sector and applied it to the Georgia Labour
Force Survey (1999) data to analyse informal employment in Georgia.
Our typology of informal employment included individuals with the
following status in either their primary or secondary jobs: (1) own-
account workers and employers in household enterprises (2) (unpaid)
contributing family workers (3) non-regular employees (i.e. employees
without stable contracts that ensure that the employing organization
pays taxes and social security contributions), (4) others employed
casually, temporarily or seasonally and (5) employees engaging in left-
hand work (or the earning of informal income at the formal workplace).
Our results show that, excluding left-hand work, in 1999 52% of
Georgia’s employed worked informally either in their primary or
secondary job, with females having slightly higher informal
employment rates than males. Private sector employment was mainly
informal, with 69% of workers informally employed, many working in
rural agriculture. Many state employees also worked informally, with
18% holding informal secondary jobs. We also found that almost half of
over 65 year olds, who already have high employment rates compared
to their EU counterparts, worked informally. Finally, the results suggest
that lower education and poverty may be associated with informal
employment; two thirds of those with secondary education worked
informally, while less than 30% of those with higher education did so,
and Georgia’s poorest regions had particularly high rates of informal
employment compared to the rest of the country. However more in-
depth analysis is required to determine whether such relationships exist.
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4.2 Policy issues and questions for further research
The hidden economy lies at the heart of the issues of poverty and
economic crisis in the countries in transition. However, it is far from
clear whether it is the cause or the solution to these problems. On the
one hand, hidden activities undermine government revenue and thereby
its ability to provide social services, contributing, amongst other things,
to the informalisation of payments for social services. They also
undermine government authority and the respect for the rule of law. On
the other hand, they provide a very important source of income and
social security in the absence of formal social protection, and they may
be an important source of economic growth, particularly in situations
where heavy government bureaucracy, regulation and corruption may
stifle formal private entrepreneurial activity.
This paper contributes to analysing the extent to which the hidden
economy is cause or solution to the economic and social problems in the
region, by providing a conceptual framework with which to analyse
distinct types of ‘hidden’ activities, which are likely to have different
implications for livelihoods, public finance and economic growth. Some
of these activities may indeed be causes of poverty and economic crisis,
while others may be solutions.
Having established a framework for analysis, further research is now
needed to assess the welfare and income-generating potential of
household, informal, underground and illegal activities. This will help to
determine which of these ‘hidden’ activities should be ‘formalised’,
eradicated, permitted, or even encouraged. The most ambiguous of
these questions will be how to address informal activities. The answer
will largely depend on the extent to which they are found to provide a
social safety net and undermine government revenue. It will also
depend on their potential for growth and on whether they contribute to
a loss of human capital by deskilling what is a relatively skilled and
educated labour force. Answering these questions will assist the
formulation of policies that effectively stimulate growth, reduce poverty
and strengthen public finance and the rule of law.
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